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Abstract: This article deals with political discussions over the place of language and religion 
in interwar Alsatian primary schools through the lens of the local Socialist Party (SFIO).  
After Alsace's return to France in 1918, primary schools became emblematic of the 
problematic process of reintegrating the recovered province, and parties from across the 
political spectrum engaged in discussions about the appropriate language of instruction and 
whether Alsatian schoolchildren should receive religious education.  For the Alsatian 
Socialists, the answer lay in the broader reform needed to ease the province's reintegration 
into France, and was associated with their self-proclaimed republicanism.  Thus the party 
argued for secularity, which would place the province on the same terrain as all other parts of 
France, and for bilingualism, which would allow the retention of Alsatian regional cultures.    
In so doing, the Alsatian SFIO reveal that not everyone in interwar France associated regional 
language with religion, or believed that republican ideas needed to come packaged in the 
French language.  Moreover, they offer an insight into the development of regional political 
cultures and into the varieties of republicanism that existed at the level of grassroots politics 
in interwar France. 
 
Les socialistes alsaciens et la politique de l'enseignement primaire en Alsace, 1918-1939 
Cet article étudie les débats ayant trait à la place de la langue et de la religion à l'école 
primaire tels qu'ils sont perçus par le parti socialiste alsacien (SFIO) dans l'entre-deux-
guerres. Après le retour de l'Alsace à la France en 1918, l'école primaire devient l'emblème 
des difficultés d'intégration que rencontre la région. Les partis politiques de tout bord 
engagent alors des débats sur la langue à utiliser à l'école ainsi sur que la place de l'éducation 
religieuse pour les jeunes Alsaciens. Pour les socialistes alsaciens, la réponse se situe au 
niveau de la large reforme nécessaire à une réintégration souple à la France. C'est pourquoi le 
parti préconise la laïcité, qui place l'Alsace sur un pied d'égalité avec le reste de la France, et 
le bilinguisme, qui contribue à la pérennité d'une culture alsacienne régionale. A travers leur 
participation à la politique de l'enseignement primaire, la SFIO alsacienne souligne les 
différentes variétés de  républicanisme populaire dans la France de l'entre-deux-guerres. 
 
 
In May 1926, the Prefect of the Bas-Rhin completed a report on a recent school strike in the 
town of Hilsenheim in northern Alsace.  There, fifteen families had failed to send their 
daughters back to school after the Easter holidays.  This had rapidly been reported by 
concerned local administrators as a protest against French legislation in the recovered 
province of Alsace, where the government‟s attempts to introduce the French language and 
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secular education into primary schools had provoked widespread resistance amongst the 
region‟s rural communities.  The previous year, almost three quarters of primary 
schoolchildren in the Alsatian countryside had missed school in protest at the planned 
introduction of inter-confessional schools into the province. Wishing to avoid further unrest, 
the worried French government requested that the Prefect investigate the matter further, and, 
to widespread relief, he reported that the incident had not been a strike at all.  Rather, in 1926 
the province switched from German to French term dates, meaning that the school year 
finished in the summer rather than the spring, and the families concerned had not realized that 
the transfer would be taking place.
1
 
This incident offers some insight into the problems that arose when the French 
government attempted to reintegrate the “lost provinces” of Alsace and Lorraine after their 
return to French rule in 1918.
2
  Yet, the government‟s readiness to interpret this mistake as 
resistance is equally revealing of the clash that reintegration provoked.  This clash was 
viewed by French officials, and has since been treated in the historical literature, as the result 
of opposing French-centralist and Alsatian-regionalist visions of Alsace‟s place within the 
French nation.
3
  Discussions over education, however, afford a glimpse into the broad range 
of local responses to the province‟s reintegration.  In Alsace, parties across the political 
spectrum treated education as emblematic of the problematic process of reintegrating the 
province into France.  And, all parties engaged with the politics of primary schooling.  The 
Catholic regionalist right led the 1925 strike movement and launched a series of demands for 
the retention of religious education and German lessons in the region's schools.  On the left, 
meanwhile, local republicans represented by the Socialist Party (Section Française de 
l'Internationale Ouvrière, or SFIO) also demanded bilingualism in Alsatian primary schools.  
But, the SFIO stressed that this should be combined with secularity as the basis for broader 
republican reform in the province.  This analysis contrasted with many of the demands of the 
Catholic right, with which the province has been more commonly associated.
4
  But, it also 
clashed with the attitudes of republican administrators in Paris.  Through their response to the 
politics of primary schooling, the Alsatian SFIO offer an insight into the varieties of 
republicanism that existed at the level of grassroots politics in interwar France. 
Republicanism in Alsace had long distinguished itself by its commitment to regional 
culture, and particularly to regional language.  At the Revolution, the region‟s literary 
societies stressed the compatibility of the German language and attachment to France.
5   
This 
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stance was adopted by subsequent republican groups, and, when a local section of the 
German Socialist Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, or SPD) was formed in the 
province, its first Alsatian leaders embraced the symbols of French republicanism but 
combined this with use of the German language.
6
  During the years of annexation, this served 
to maintain links with France and to foster Alsatian republican political cultures.  In 1918, the 
province was restored to French rule and the local SPD voted unanimously to join the SFIO 
the following year.  Again, local leaders adopted the symbols and rhetoric of French 
republicanism and proclaimed their attachment to the French republican tradition.
7
  This time, 
however, their aim was to facilitate the integration of Alsace into the French Republic.  The 
new SFIO Federations in Alsace thought of themselves as republicans, and associated 
themselves with the republican tradition.  Throughout the interwar years, the party articulated 
their republicanism in the German language, which was the language of the majority of the 
population.  Equally, it saw no contradiction between use of the German language and their 
French republicanism.  The experience of nineteenth century French rule and of annexation 
had fostered an understanding amongst Alsatian Socialist leaders that French patriotism was 
compatible with the German language. 
This stance clashed with the attitudes of successive governments after the province‟s 
return to France in 1918.  While late eighteenth and nineteenth century governments had 
translated laws and decrees into German for dissemination in Alsace, the Third Republic had 
attempted to spread the French language throughout the country's regions.
8
  Having been 
subjects of Germany since 1871, the Alsatian population had missed out on these years of 
French nation-building.
 9
  The result was that the stress placed by the French administration 
upon use of the French language came as a surprise to all political parties in Alsace after 
1918.
  
  For the French government, on the other hand, Alsace‟s proximity to Germany, 
combined with the existence of an Alsatian separatist movement funded by German finances, 
meant that the dissemination of the French language in the recovered provinces became the 
central political priority of the governments of the interwar years.
10
 
A second problem associated with the German language was the connection made in 
the Third Republic between regional language and the Catholic Church.  For the republicans 
of the early Third Republic, the dissemination of the French language had served the 
additional function of reducing the influence of the Catholic clergy.  The SFIO in Alsace took 
up the Radicals‟ anti-clerical position, and worked hard to eliminate religious instruction 
from Alsatian schools and to secure the introduction of separation of church and state into the 
recovered provinces.  But, it did not adopt their stance on language.  Instead, throughout the 
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interwar years the Alsatian SFIO sought to disassociate the German language and the 
Catholic Church, and presented German as the language of regional republicanism.  This had 
important implications for the party's attitude towards schooling, as Socialist leaders argued 
that German, as the majority language of the province‟s population, should have an important 
place in the school curriculum.  This stance was the result of historical circumstances which 
had fostered a strong commitment to regional culture and language.  For the left, it allowed 
the development of a distinctly regional republicanism based on the assumption that 
republican ideas did not need to be packaged in the French language.   
In this way, the centrality of language and religion to discussions over primary 
schooling meant that education in interwar Alsace acquired acute political importance.  This 
was compounded by existing understandings of the role of education in nation-building.  In 
nineteenth and early twentieth century Europe, states had turned their attention to the 
construction of national systems of education as part of their efforts to forge a national 
culture and spread the national language.
11
  In the lively debate on nation-building in France, 
scholars have assigned primary schools a pivotal role in the creation of identities, the 
dissemination of the French language and the adoption of national values.
12
  Alsace, with its 
complex political associations with France and Germany, represents a unique case among 
French regions.  But, as Stephen Harp has shown, primary schools in the province were 
nevertheless mobilized as part of late nineteenth century attempts to create an imagined 
national community in Alsace.
13
  This function continued after 1918, when the French 
administration was keen to alter the system instituted under German rule, which allowed for 
religious education and classes in German.  In Paris, this situation appeared untenable within 
the secular French Republic. Within the province, responses varied.  The resulting clash of 
expectations led the question of the region‟s primary school system to become the topic of 
contentious political debate throughout the interwar years. 
This article is concerned with the response of the Socialist Party in Alsace to the 
question of primary schooling in interwar Alsace, and particularly with their analysis of 
language and religion.  This represents a useful counterbalance to the better known history of 
the region‟s Catholic and autonomist right, but it also offers a critical example of the ways in 
which regional republicanism did not develop in a linear fashion in France.  Rather, it was 
being honed and contested in response to a series of challenges throughout the interwar years.  
And in Alsace, the Socialists forged their own version of republicanism, which they 
identified with national ideology and which developed in response to the circumstances in the 
province.  The first section of the article establishes the context of interwar discussions over 
primary schooling, tracing developments in education before 1918 and the status of the 
French and German languages in the province.  It then addresses the relationship between 
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church and state and the development of electoral politics in the years after the return to 
France.  Section two discusses how the Socialists‟ attitude towards language and religion 
affected the party‟s response to developments in education in the 1920s, as the new French 
government introduced programs to regulate schooling in Alsace.  The final section discusses 
the SFIO‟s tactics in the 1930s, as the altered political context led to changes in the party‟s 
presentation of its program for education and an increased focus on religion.  Throughout, the 
party demonstrated a regional sense of Frenchness that is revealing of the tensions and 




Alsatian primary schools presented a particular problem for the French government after 
1918.  Firstly, they had missed out on the changes made to the French system between 1870 
and 1918, when education had been a fundamental plank in the republican platform of 
reform.
14
  In the 1880s, Prime Minister Jules Ferry‟s laws had made French primary 
education free, secular and compulsory, and Emile Combes‟ ministry had banned religious 
orders from teaching in 1904.  The following year, the government abrogated the Napoleonic 
Concordat, instituting the separation of church and state in France.  Moreover, in the years 
after 1870, primary schools had become an important means of spreading the French 
language in areas where Breton, Catalan, Corsican, Flemish or Basque dominated.
15
  As a 
result of these reforms, primary education became associated with the Republican manifesto 
of centralization, characterized by a standardized curriculum, uniform language and 
secularity.   
Secondly, the German Reich had not modified the Loi Falloux of 1850, initially 
introduced by the French Second Republic to assure the primacy of religious education in 
France‟s primary schools.  Having been untouched by the province‟s new rulers after 1870, 
this legislation remained in application in Alsace in 1918.  The Empire‟s main project had 
been to make attendance at primary schools obligatory, and the Alsatian curriculum remained 
distinct from the various programs used in the other German states.  The German 
administration did, however, maintain both the stress on religious instruction and the 
divisions between Catholic, Protestant and Jewish pupils.  As a result, in 1918 when Alsace-
Lorraine returned to French rule, the government was faced with a very different education 
system to that in place across the rest of the country.   
The problems that these differences posed educational reformers were compounded 
by the distinctive linguistic situation in the province.  On their arrival in Alsace, French 
administrators expressed their surprise at the widespread use of the German language.  Most 
Alsatians spoke Alsatian dialect rather than high German, or Hochdeutsch, but, regional 
variations and the lack of a coherent written form, meant that German was habitually used in 
communication and in the press across the two Alsatian departments.
16  
 This posed problems 
for the French government; as Paul Bastier, the sub-Prefect of Sélestat noted in 1925, “The 
main German claim on Alsace results from the Alsatians speaking German dialect.  
Therefore, in Alsace, the political problem is actually a linguistic problem.”17  Such 
associations between Alsatian dialect and the German language and German national identity 
meant that the need to teach the Alsatians French took on an urgency that had not been shared 
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by earlier efforts to teach French to regional populations in Flanders, Brittany or Provence.
18
  
Despite increases in French usage over the interwar years, by 1931, just 5.6 percent spoke 
only French and barely over half of Alsace‟s population spoke “some French,” while 43.9 
percent spoke only Alsatian dialect or German.
19
  A British diplomat stationed in Strasbourg 
in 1930 recorded his surprise that “everyone, even French officials, seemed to be speaking 
German.”20  Levels of French were still sufficiently low that when they were evacuated in 
1939, children received a free French-German dictionary and French grammar book intended, 
according to an anonymous note in the file, to allow them to “learn French.”21  Despite the 
relatively low levels of French usage in 1939, the introduction of the language had been a 
central component of the Alsatian policy of almost all interwar governments.  Various 
administrations introduced a range of programs to promote the use of French, but concern 
over popular opinion in the province meant that governments proved reluctant to introduce a 
blanket policy. 
The political importance of language in Alsace was closely connected to the question 
of religion.  This served to affect the way in which language was approached by both 
administrators in Paris and by politicians in Alsace.  Within the province, continued relations 
between church and state and the unusual provincial role of the clergy served as a point of 
distinction from the rest of France.  Church and state had been formally separated in France 
in 1905, when Alsace had been under German rule.  Separation had not been extended to 
Alsace, which retained the Napoleonic Concordat regulating the church-state relationship and 
state payment for church ministers.  Given the importance of separation in the Third 
Republic, the question of the Concordat became a crucial issue in the province‟s 
reintegration.  More than a decade after the province‟s return, one French periodical 
described the religious question as “the principal difficulty of the Alsatian problem.”22  
Additional problems arose as the Catholic clergy held an unusual political importance in 
Alsace.  In 1871, sections of the Alsatian social and political elite had opted to leave the 
province for France, rather than become German citizens.
23
  In their absence, many priests 
took on a political role.  In 1874, eight of the eleven Alsatian deputies belonged to the 
Catholic party, a total which included the Bishop of Strasbourg and five other priests.
24
  The 
clergy‟s political visibility declined slightly in the later years of annexation, but they resumed 
this position of leadership in 1918 as the ruling elite again left the province, this time for 
Germany.  The province also contained a significant Protestant minority; Protestants made up 
26.5 percent of the regional population in 1919, a figure that had dropped to 21.4 percent in 
1931.
25
   The province‟s largely urban Jewish population constituted 1.9 percent of the 
population in 1919, and 1.7 percent in 1931.
26
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 Such linguistic and religious distinctiveness shaped politics in the region throughout 
the interwar years, and contributed to a distinct regionalization of local politics.  The majority 
of the population was unable to read the national French press, which permitted the 
domination of regional publications that tended to focus on Alsatian issues.  Moreover, 
political meetings were held in Alsatian, with the result that external speakers needed either 
to speak German or to have their speeches translated from French.
27
  This discouraged non-
Alsatian speakers from attending meetings in the province, and contributed further to the 
regionalization of politics.  The SFIO, like its rival parties, used the German language in its 
press, at political meetings and in its publications.  Equally, the enduring strength of 
organized religion affected party-politics.  Local police reports stress the level of obedience 
that the clergy was able to command.
28
  This situation was reflected in low levels of 
abstention in areas with high numbers of Catholics and in the difficulties faced by all parties 
in organizing political meetings during religious festivals.
29
    
The distinctive situation created by such cultural particularities was compounded by 
the existence of separate Alsatian parties.  The Alsatian Socialists were the only regional 
party to join an existing French party.  Its main rival during the period of German rule, the 
Catholic Center of Alsace-Lorraine, created a new party in 1919, arguing that no major 
Catholic grouping in France shared its preoccupations.
30
  Named the Union Populaire 
Républicaine (UPR), it retained the Center‟s social Catholicism and demanded the retention 
of Alsatian regionalist particularities, notably the Concordat and use of the German language.  
Less members of the clergy held leadership positions within the UPR than had been the case 
in the Center, but the party maintained close links with the Catholic Church.
31
  Meanwhile, 
many former Liberals constituted the Parti Républican Démocratique, which demanded 
regional decentralization and the postponement of the introduction of religious legislation, 
and a section of the Parti Radical et Radical Socialiste represented the Radical program in the 
region.  This was a minority party.
32
   
In December 1920, the majority of Socialist militants left the SFIO to form the 
Section Française de l‟Internationale Communiste, later the Parti Communiste Français 
(PCF).  The Alsatian Socialist Federations, particularly the sections in the Bas-Rhin, lost 
militants and leaders.
33
  By 1921, the Communist section in the Bas-Rhin had around 4000 
members, which represented the fifth highest departmental total in France, and dwarfed the 
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remaining Socialist membership of 1000.
34
  The Alsatian Communists were to have a 
significant impact upon politics in the region.  Crucially, the new PCF distinguished itself 
from the SFIO not only in terms of its attitude towards the Communist International, but also 
in its national position.  The Alsatian Communists argued in favor of self determination for 
the population of Alsace-Lorraine, denounced French imperialism and demanded Alsatian 
neutrality.  This stance created a clash with the pro-French SFIO that proved difficult for the 
two parties to resolve.  It also led to the expulsion of the PCF‟s two leaders, Charles Hueber 
and Jean-Pierre Mourer, for placing the national question over the class struggle.
35
  
Politics in Alsace were affected by the development of autonomism, a political 
phenomenon that dominates much of the historical literature on the province.
36
    
Autonomists criticized French policy in the region, and argued for the retention of Alsatian 
particularities, or, in the movement‟s most extreme form, demanded separation from France. 
Rather than one party, autonomism represented a movement that permeated the rhetoric of 
almost all parties in Alsace.  It also contributed to the development of the Homeland League, 
the Heimatbund, whose 1926 manifesto demanded regional administration, bilingualism and 
respect for the religious status quo.
37
  Autonomist tensions peaked in the April 1928 trial of 
autonomist leaders, four of whom were found guilty but subsequently pardoned.
38
  From the 
end of the 1920s, autonomism found its strongest expression in the Landespartei, the 
Bauernbund, and in the Elsässische Arbeiter- und Bauernpartei founded by former PCF 
leaders Hueber and Mourer.
39
 
This distinctive political environment affected discussions over primary schooling, 
but it also affected the ideological stance and development of the SFIO in Alsace.  In a 
political environment dominated by autonomism, and in competition for working class votes 
with the PCF, the SFIO increasingly stressed its pro-French, pro-republican credentials.  This 
led Socialist leaders to assert the party‟s assimilationist demand that Alsace should be 
integrated into France on exactly the same terms as all other parts of the hexagone.  This 
stance was accepted by its rival parties in the interwar years, and has since been accepted, 
albeit in modified form, by historians working on the period.
40
  This position is confirmed by 
the party‟s uncompromising approach to the issue of separation of church and state, yet it 
masks important fluidity in the SFIO‟s outlook, which party leaders nevertheless presented as 
a coherent vision of the French Republic.  Such exceptions included municipal legislation, 
social reform, and, crucially, use of Alsatian dialect and the German language.
41
  Discussions 
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over language came to focus upon education in the province, where their intersection with 
parallel debates over religion was brought into sharp relief.  The political importance of 
education led the SFIO to focus upon the issue, and its arguments for teaching in German and 
secular education offers a window onto the regional republicanism that the party forged at the 




On its election in 1919, the new right wing Bloc National government turned its attention to 
primary schooling, focusing firstly upon the question of language.
42
  In November 1918, the 
academic inspector at Colmar reported that all capable teachers would teach two hours of 
French daily, and that half of all other subjects should be in French.
43
  In response, SFIO 
leaders argued that the government was creating a generation which could not understand 
French or German.  Such criticism proved widespread, with a number of politicians and 
teachers echoing the Socialists‟ claims throughout the interwar years.44  The diary of Alsatian 
primary schoolteacher Philippe Husser describes a range of problems with this “direct 
method” used in Alsatian schools, which being beyond the capacities of most Alsatian 
children, left them to “sink or swim.”  According to Husser, most found themselves sinking. 
45
  While its argument reflected widely-held views in the province, the SFIO interpreted the 
instruction of French in a different way to its rival political parties.  The Socialists argued that 
giving lessons only in French would have the worst effects upon workers, who relied on 
primary schools for their education.  As a result, they needed to receive their instruction in 
German to allow them to understand the lessons.
46
  This would be coupled with recognition 
of the German language in other spheres of public life to ensure that “those [members of the 
Alsatian population] who cannot learn [French] do not suffer.”47   
The Socialists‟ stress upon the class-based character of language reflected broader 
linguistic divisions in the province, where the working classes were far less likely to speak 
French than the middle or upper classes.
48
  It was also an attempt to assert its revolutionary 
credentials in light of its rivalry with the PCF, which represented a significant rival for 
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  Nevertheless, instruction in German should, the SFIO argued, be 
complemented by courses in French to allow Alsatian children to learn their national 
language, and to participate fully in public life.
50
  Again, this was a class-based concern, as 
the party argued that the working classes‟ inability to speak French led them to lose out on 
social and economic opportunities.  Therefore, it argued that the only solution to the linguistic 
problem in the province was bilingualism; that “The French language must be taught to all, 
without exception, but that knowledge of German must also be promoted, so that each 
Alsatian can not only read, but also write [German].”51   
Ongoing Franco-German tension in the years immediately after the First World War 
meant that endorsement of the German language presented a political problem for the SFIO.   
The party was, after all, demanding use of the language of a rival foreign power.  As a result, 
the Socialists treated bilingualism as an essential aspect of the reintegration process more 
generally and argued for the use of both languages not only in education but also in the 
judiciary, in legislation, administration and culture.  They stressed that without bilingualism, 
French legislation would remain a “dead letter” for the majority of the population of Alsace 
and the Moselle.
52
  This made endorsement of bilingualism an assertion of the party‟s French 
credentials, as well as a program that would serve the best interests of the province‟s working 
class population.  Bilingualism, above all, would facilitate reintegration and allow the 
integration of Alsatian workers into the French nation.  Crucially, it was through education 
that such bilingualism would be achieved, as Strasbourg SFIO Deputy Georges Weill argued, 
“We have always demanded that the French language have a... important place in education, 
so that it can become, as quickly as possible, the intellectual vehicle of all the population.  
And we have equally demanded that, in our border departments, we use and learn the 
language, which is currently still the fluent language of the vast majority of its inhabitants.  
On this double principle, there would be neither discussion nor discord.”53 
On this matter Weill was correct.  While the SFIO stance was distinctive in terms of 
its stress upon class, demands for bilingualism reflected popular attitudes in the province. 
Alsatians from all sections of society called for the use of German.  Moreover other Alsatian 
parties focused their attention on the promotion of German, so the Socialist stress on the 
importance of French also proved popular.
54
   But, the Socialists found themselves in an 
entirely separate situation as discussions over education became increasingly focused on 
religion after the end of 1918.  This came as a surprise to the SFIO, which viewed the 
separation of church and state and secular education as fundamental aspects of French 
national cultures.  Consequently, it had anticipated that both would be introduced in Alsace 
immediately after the return to France.  This aim was, however, to be repeatedly frustrated. 
  When the Bloc National came to power in 1919 it did not attempt to establish secular 
schools in the recovered provinces.  Instead, it introduced a directive allowing parents to 
excuse their children from religious education.  To do so, they needed to contact the local 
sub-Prefect and wait for a response, but unsurprisingly, this was often a lengthy process.  
Moreover, the new government did not repeal an 1871 decree which allowed for the 
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punishment of parents whose children did not regularly attend school with a fine of up to 10 
francs, or, in cases of prolonged absence, by imprisonment of a week or more.  Local 
administrators frequently interpreted this law to cover parents whose children missed 
religious education, and in 1929, one father was sent to prison after his son missed a number 
of religious education classes, much to the chagrin of the SFIO.
 55
   
 Throughout the years of Bloc National government, the Socialists criticized its failure 
to introduce secularity to the recovered provinces, arguing that this had denied the Alsatians 
the opportunity to participate fully in the French nation, and to become French citizens in the 
complete sense of the term.
56
  It stressed that such obstacles were incompatible with the 
principles of unity and indivisibility of the Republic, and served only to reinforce the existing 
isolation that the province‟s linguistic separation and years of annexation had created.57  Like 
language, religion was connected to the province's reintegration into France and Socialist 
leaders stressed that the separation of church and state and introduction of legislation would 
ease the already problematic reintegration process.
58
  It would “allow a faster assimilation of 
our three departments into the motherland, allowing secular France to finally show its true 
republican face to its recovered brothers.”59  In this sense, the failure to introduce secular 
education was a betrayal of the French Republic; “… From a political point of view, Alsace 
hoped for change [after 1914].  It became French again, and looked forward to the Republic‟s 
return to the old country of liberty… [but] the French secular and democratic revolution has 
become the champion of intolerance in Alsace; it does not smile on republicans.”60  In this 
sense, for the Alsatian Socialists, use of the German language was compatible with 
attachment to the Republic, but a continued place for religious education in the region‟s 
schools was not.  Instead, this provided a barrier to the province‟s complete integration into 
the Republic, and prevented its population from becoming true French citizens. 
After the 1924 victory of the center-left Cartel des Gauches, new Radical Premier 
Edouard Herriot announced his intention of separating church and state in Alsace and the 
Moselle, a project which would mean the end of religious education in the provinces.  The 
SFIO supported Herriot‟s proposals, but warned that secular schools should be created in a 
way which could not be perceived as an attack on religion.  The SFIO was right to be worried 
about the Catholic response.  The UPR and clergy arranged a series of protests, repeating the 
successful tactics that they had earlier used to argue against the proposed separation of church 
and state in Alsace and the Moselle.
61
  They also organized a protest petition which collected 
375 000 signatures.
62
  According to the Catholic Alsacien, 643 communes in Alsace, two 
thirds of the total number, protested against the introduction of secular schools.
63
  Protestant 
and Jewish leaders also organized resistance, but their smaller numbers meant the protests 
made less impact.
64
  In light of the situation, Herriot switched tack, and in March 1925, he 
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ordered Alsatian and Mosellan prefects to allow local municipalities to establish inter-
confessional schools.  In Alsace, this was rapidly taken up by Socialist dominated councils 
across the province, but the party remained concerned about the potential Catholic response 
to the change.   
As a result, the SFIO avoided political rhetoric in its explanation of the transfer.  
Instead, it stressed the practical benefits of the new schools.  An explanatory pamphlet issued 
by Colmar's Socialist municipal council explained that with inter-confessional schools, 
children would attend the closest school, the program would remain the same, and religious 
instruction would still be part of the curriculum and given only by a master of the same 
confession.  The SFIO again used the language of social equality, and painted the new school 
as a place where children associate without difference of religious confession.  This would 
prepare the province‟s young for an economic future where citizens of all faiths worked 
alongside one another.  In this sense, rather than an attack on religion the school was “an 
instrument in tolerance and comprehension and will serve to safeguard religious peace.”65  It 
would also put all children onto the same footing, regardless of social background, which 
meant that inter-confessional schools represented the best method of achieving equality 
amongst Alsatian children.  Here, references to class and social advancement that had served 
the SFIO‟s support of the German language were used to argue against confessional schools, 
as the party‟s approach to schooling reflected its broader political attitudes. 
In spite of the SFIO‟s attempts to appease the Catholic population through its 
practical presentation of inter-confessional schools, the issue provoked further unrest.
66
  In 
1925, Arch-Bishop Ruch of Strasbourg called a school strike for March 16, 1925 in protest at 
the decision of municipal councils in Strasbourg, Colmar, Schiltigheim, Graffenstaden, 
Guebwiller and Huningue to introduce inter-confessional schools.  This strike was observed 
by large numbers of Catholics across the region.  According to the Commissaire Général, in 
large towns such as Colmar, Strasbourg, and Mulhouse and in certain smaller towns 
including Ribeauvillé, Guebwiller, Molsheim and Schiltigheim, the proportion of Catholic 
children absent from school ranged from 20 to 30 percent.  But, in the countryside the total of 
Catholics on strike reached between 70 and 75 percent.  Across the two departments of 
Alsace, 50 percent of students in the Bas-Rhin and 57 percent in the Haut-Rhin missed school 
on the day of the strike.
67
  Teacher Philippe Husser‟s diary notes that three children in his 
class in Sundhoffen did not come to school, and around sixty children were absent from the 
total 300 in the school.  He concluded that the strike “was not general,” although the lower 
than average figures were likely to be a result of the large numbers of Protestants in that area 
of the Haut-Rhin.
68
  Across the province, levels of participation in the strike were lower 
amongst Protestant and Jewish children than amongst their Catholic counterparts.
69
 
In the days after the strike, the SFIO attempted to downplay its significance.  Mayor 
of Strasbourg Jacques Peirotes stated that 73 percent of children had not been involved, 
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adding that two thirds of the population of Strasbourg was in favor of secular schools.
70
  This 
reflected the situation in urban Alsace, which was also the SFIO‟s main constituency.  Yet, as 
the Commissaire’s figures showed, the picture in the countryside was very different.  Faced 
with widespread rural participation in the strike, the Socialists switched their focus to the 
clergy, arguing that priests had coerced families into keeping their children from school.  The 
Bas-Rhin SFIO newspaper the Freie Presse contained reports of clerical manipulation, 
complaining that Alsatian instituteurs had distributed Ligue des Catholiques d’Alsace tracts 
to their students.  These tracts reportedly described the current situation as a struggle for 
religious liberties, and stated that all priests would be imprisoned and children banned from 
prayer if Herriot‟s proposals went ahead.71  An article by militant Charles Hincker described 
his experiences on the day of the strike, when he heard from a friend that his daughter had 
gone to the Cercle Catholique without his permission.  On going to look for her, he found her 
there along with a large group of children, all of whom had their school bags, indicating that 
their parents had intended that they go to school.  The children told him that the clergy had 
offered them chocolate and sweets if they went to the Cercle instead.  He told them to go to 
school, and all of the children did so without protest.
72
    
Such descriptions of manipulation, bribery and coercion on the part of the clergy were 
not unusual in the interwar Socialist press, particularly as the party was attempting to 
persuade the government that the clergy had misrepresented the views of the population of 
Alsace regarding the introduction of French legislation.  Here, however, they adopted greater 
urgency as the SFIO became increasingly concerned that the clergy were hijacking the 
reintegration process.  Nevertheless, many of these anecdotes appear to have been based on 
some degree of truth.  Notes to the Prefect of the Bas-Rhin described clerical coercion to stop 
children going to school, and Husser stated that in the Haut-Rhin town of Dornach, the curate 
kept children in the church after the 8 o‟clock service to prevent them from attending class 
and that schools were blocked off to prevent children from getting into the buildings.
73
  In 
spite of this evidence, the government was put off by the scale of the Catholic reaction.  After 
Herriot fell from power in 1925, his successors proved reluctant to introduce the legislation 
and a 1927 arrêté confirmed the place of religious education, granting it four hours per week 
in the curriculum.
74
   
While governments appeared to ignore the SFIO‟s demands for secular education, 
their stress on the necessity for more classes in German met a better response in 1927.  The 
government fixed the education of German from the beginning of school and introduced a 
German test in the program of the certificate of studies.  Nevertheless, the SFIO criticized the 
limit on German education of three hours, as well as the assumption that four hours of 
religious education, given in German, would improve the German language of Alsatian 
students.  Having supported the rights of Alsatian students to opt out of religious education, it 
argued in favor of more hours for German itself.  Equally, it stressed, religious education 
should be given outside school hours by the priest, pastor or rabbi rather than the teacher.
75
  
Here, the intersection between language and religion reveals the particular character of the 
Alsatian SFIO‟s republicanism.  During the Third Republic, educational reformers had 
sought to introduce the French language to limit the control that the clergy were able to 
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exercise over regional populations.
76
  In interwar Alsace, the SFIO sought to eliminate the 
association between religion and regional language by stressing that religious education 
conducted in German was not sufficient education in the majority language of the province.  
Alsatian dialect and the German language were not only the language of the regional Catholic 
Church, they were also the language of local republican politics.  This had been the case 
before 1870, and it remained the case after 1918.  As a result, the party sought to separate 
local language from religion in the national imagination. 
This disassociation between regional language and the Catholic Church met with 
some degree of success, and the French government did not treat the clergy or the 
continuation of religious education as a barrier to the dissemination of the French language.  
So while in many ways, the Catholic reaction in Alsace paralleled earlier regional resistance 
in France to the introduction of secularity in the years before 1905, it was the government‟s 
response that differed in the interwar years.
77
  After 1918, successive governments were 
prepared to tolerate religious education and, to a lesser extent, the use of German in Alsatian 
schools.  This did not represent a more regionalist official policy; rather it reflected the 
political circumstances in interwar Alsace.  Within the province, the SFIO was the only major 
party to demand the introduction of French legislation, and it did so alongside an attachment 
to the German language that many French administrators found difficult to equate with its 
proclaimed republicanism.  The PCF denounced French imperialism and the autonomist 
movement sought regional neutrality, while in Germany, nationalist forces granted financial 
support to autonomist demands.
78
  And, in spite of the UPR‟s regionalist demands, Catholic 
orders had developed a reputation for Francophilia during the years of annexation.  
Moreover, the Alsatians‟ use of the German language and attachment to the province‟s 
religious particularities did not sit easily with early Third Republican rhetoric that had 
declared the Alsatians to be staunch French patriots.
79
  When these factors collided with the 
Bloc National‟s policy of appeasing and promoting Catholicism, and the center-left‟s 
instability and altered priorities in government, they served to create a particular situation.  
Not only was the late Third Republic less concerned with unity in secularity than often 
assumed, but its altered political priorities allowed successive governments to tolerate 
religious education in Alsace.  For these governments, language was the priority and they 
were prepared to tolerate continued religious education in Alsatian schools as they focused on 
their aim of spreading the French language. 
Neither policy pleased the Alsatian SFIO, which wanted official status for the German 
language, the introduction of secular education and the disassociation of language and 
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religion.  Party leaders stressed the pressing need for both these policies to the national SFIO, 
and used the National Assembly to reassert their demands consistently throughout the 1920s.  
Whilst discussing the provincial situation with their national colleagues, their focus was on 
religion.  When they attended national party congresses, Alsatian representatives attempted to 
underline the pervasive influence of religion upon politics in the region.
80
  In part, however, 
their focus on religion rather than language also reflected their assumption that this aspect of 
their program would be of greater interest to their national colleagues.  Within Alsace, the 
SFIO made impassioned arguments that it was possible to combine use of the German 
language with attachment to the French Republic.  Nevertheless, it stressed that republican 
identity required access to the fundamental institutions of the Republic, notably secular 
education underpinned by the separation of church and state.  These attitudes continued to 
guide SFIO policy in the 1930s, as the party betrayed its increased frustration at the widening 




Through the second decade after the return to France, the SFIO continued to criticize 
particular aspects of the existing education system in Alsace, such as the continuation of 
religious education in German rather than distinct German lessons.  The party also attempted 
to foster a more republican atmosphere in the classroom.  In Mulhouse in 1933, SFIO 
councilor Risch complained about the catechism taught in Alsatian schools, which 
represented “a direct poisoning of youth and public opinion.”81  Risch stated: 
 
We are republicans… and the way in which the French Revolution is presented by the 
historical section of the catechism… is revolting… the French Revolution is one of 
the greatest events in the history of civilization…[but] the historical section only 
outlines the transgressions against religion.  It ignores the changes that the Revolution 
brought for civilization.  A child who reads the historical section would believe that 
the French Revolution consisted of beheading people, without explaining why that 
was done.  There is not a single word on the great social progress that the Revolution 
brought… The historical section does not contain one word on the granting of 
personal liberty… As such, the historical section is absolutely unacceptable for 




The SFIO was concerned that the continuation of religious education in the region‟s 
schools granted the Catholic clergy undue influence over Alsatian youth.  This built upon an 
earlier controversy in the town, when the local SFIO council had ordered Gauthier graphics 
to create an illustration of French history.  These images showed the axes of the monarchy 
and clergy declining, while the axes of the people and bourgeoisie rose throughout history 
until they came together in 1789 in a tricolor entitled “liberté, égalité, fraternité.”83  
According to the Recteur de l'Académie, only five schools in the town put them up, and the 
administration did not encourage them to do so.
 84
  Indeed, Premier Raymond Poincaré told 
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the Prefect of the Haut-Rhin that these graphics were “inappropriate” in the province‟s inter-
confessional schools, much to the frustration of the town‟s Socialist municipal council.85   
Frustrations at this event spilled over into Risch‟s analysis of the catechism.  In particular, the 
party worried that the presentation of French history in confessional schools misrepresented 
France and the republican tradition.  This was particularly important given the centrality of 
French revolutionary history in the ideologies of republicanism and French identity 
articulated by the Alsatian Socialists.   
In this sense, the conflict over religious education in Alsace was part of a broader 
clash between republican and clerical conceptions of “True France” that characterized the 
Third Republic.
86
  Throughout its discussions over Alsatian reintegration, the SFIO offered a 
vision of France rooted in the revolutions of 1789 and the nineteenth century.  This France, it 
argued, had been corrupted by right wing government and it was unfortunate that the return 
of Alsace coincided with the election victory of the forces of “reaction, capitalists, militarists, 
clericals, mercenaries and bourgeoisie.”87  As a result, it was the responsibility of the 
recovered populations to return France to its republican course.  In 1924, Strasbourg 
councilor Eugene Imbs had reminded his audience that “during the first Revolution, our 
ancestors could see a sign on the bridge at Kehl.  It read „Here begins the country of liberty.‟  
It is for us to cultivate this „country of liberty,‟ to transform it according to our ideas, as we 
envision the true fraternity of the people against capitalism.”88   
For the SFIO, the nature of France was still in the making, and the reintegration of its 
lost province offered the opportunity for wider reform of its national institutions.  For the 
Alsatian Socialists the experience of shifting sovereignty had shaped their sense of republican 
citizenship.  Yet the SFIO‟s switch in focus to individual aspects of the teaching in schools is 
also revealing of its growing disappointment at the failure of successive governments to 
introduce legislation confirming the place of the German language, or introducing secular 
education into the province.  In this atmosphere, on January 29, 1929, Premier Raymond 
Poincaré reaffirmed the maintenance of the statut scolaire in Alsace and the Moselle, 
underlining the place of religion in the Alsatian education system.  The entry of a new center-
left wing government in 1932 offered fresh hope for the Alsatian SFIO, and in 1933, this was 
partially met by the Guy La Chambre circular which allowed parents to remove their children 
from religious education by making a declaration to the head teacher, rather than informing 
the sub-prefect and waiting for a response.
89
  The result was that the number of Alsatian 
children excused from religious education doubled, although the total was still less than 1000 
of 150 000 children.
90
   
In the mid-1930s, national politics underwent a fundamental shift.  The increased 
strength of the extreme right in France and the accession to power of fascist regimes in 
Germany and Italy contributed to the formation of an anti-fascist Rassemblement of the 
forces of the left and the center.
91
  Titled the Popular Front, this Rassemblement brought 
together the SFIO, PCF and Radicals.  In Alsace, the front was dominated by the SFIO in 
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light of the weakness of the Radicals and orthodox communists, the second of which had 
been badly affected by the loss of local leaders Charles Hueber and Jean-Pierre Mourer, who 
had been expelled from the party in 1930.  The optimistic mood following the Front‟s 
formation led the Alsatian federations to stress once again the particular situation in the 
province to their national colleagues, in the hope that a Socialist prime minister would 
introduce the legislation demanded by the local party should he be elected.   
At the SFIO‟s Mulhouse conference of June 1935, the Federation of the Haut-Rhin 
placed the issue of secular schools on the agenda, and former Mulhouse deputy Salomon 
Grumbach stressed the pervasive character of religion in Alsatian primary schools, which, he 
argued, extended beyond the religious education classes on the timetable.  Grumbach outlined 
the ways in which religion seeped into the choice of books, as well as the teaching of history, 
science and morals.
92
  He called on his colleagues to support the Haut-Rhin Federation‟s 
motion in support of secular schooling, affirming the party‟s earlier argument that its 
demands were rooted in a spirit of religious tolerance.  Grumbach also developed the party‟s 
contention that the introduction of secular education would facilitate the region‟s 
reintegration, and argued that secularity was the best means of assuring the “French character 
of the three departments, to remove all the walls that separated [them] from the rest of the 
country, and to promote the education of the French language.”93  Bas-Rhin leader Marcel-
Edmund Naegelen reinforced Grumbach‟s arguments when he called upon their national 
colleagues to support the Haut-Rhin motion, and to finally allow the Alsatians to “enter into 
the democratic and secular Republic.”94  Grumbach and Naegelen‟s speeches met with loud 
applause, and agreement that there should not be “two Frances” within the “République une 
et indivisible” before the Congress voted its support for the Haut-Rhin motion.95 
In their stress upon the urgent necessity to introduce secular education into Alsace and 
the Moselle, the Alsatian Socialists employed their usual description of confessional schools 
as a barrier that prevented the region‟s entry into the Republic.  But, they also argued that 
confessional schools represented a means to “promote the education of the French 
language”.96  This did not represent a departure, as the party had always stressed the 
importance of learning French.  But, the province‟s delegates did not couple this with any 
discussion of the German language or bilingualism.  This reflected their renewed focus upon 
religious education in light of the polarization of national politics and the resulting threat that 
they perceived to secular education across the country.
97
   
But, there were other reasons for the party‟s neglect of the question of the German 
language.  Firstly, the political context had changed.  The creation of the Popular Front meant 
that the SFIO‟s rivalry with the PCF became less important than its rivalry with Hueber‟s 
Communist Autonomists, the UPR and the autonomist parties.  The SFIO distinguished itself 
from these parties by its pro-French, national, assimilationist stance which prioritized the 
question of religion.  Secondly, party leaders worried that debate over the use of the German 
language could prove a distraction from the issue of education, and the pressing need to 
reduce the influence wielded by the Alsatian clergy.  Such concern about the possible 
response to the party‟s stance on German reflected awareness of the international context and 
developments in the Third Reich, but it also betrayed their worries that the national party did 
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not share their attitude towards the importance of the German language.  As a result, the party 
focused on the question of religious education. 
 The year after the Congress, the Popular Front government triumphed in the elections 
and Léon Blum became the first Socialist to take the post of Premier.  The new government 
soon turned its attention to schooling, offering fresh hope to the Alsatian SFIO.  In 1936, it 
introduced an eighth year of schooling for children across France.  This was to include Alsace 
and the Moselle, where children already had one more year of schooling than their 
counterparts in the rest of the country, and would give Alsatian boys a ninth year in school.  
In response, Catholic politicians, the clergy and sections of the public launched a fresh protest 
over the issue, arguing that boys needed to work at fourteen, particularly in rural areas.  As a 
result, the government supplemented the law with a decree that specified that if Alsatian and 
Mosellan schools renounced the education of German and religion, boys could be relieved of 
the extra year and released at fourteen as in the rest of France.  It stated that in the province, 
an additional year was necessary in light of the extra time devoted to the supplementary 
subjects taught in Alsatian schools.  A number of Socialist and Radical municipalities took up 
the offer, leading to a renewal of Catholic resistance in the province.   
The clergy organized a petition numbering some 450 000 signatures.
98
  This was a 
rise from the 375 000 collected in 1925, and worryingly for the government, this was 
compounded with widespread passive resistance.  Teachers failed to report absences, 
cantonal judges gave dispensations to work at home whether or not the criteria was met, the 
clergy encouraged parents to disobey the law and several Mayors failed to inform their 
constituents of the legislation.
99
  In response, the SFIO argued that the Catholic clergy was 
again attempting to manipulate public opinion.
100
  As part of the Popular Front, it was joined 
by the region‟s radicals and orthodox communists in condemning “the agitation organized by 
the clericals regarding the prolongation of education” and expressed satisfaction “that this 
campaign has failed.”101  Meanwhile, the SFIO and local unions passed a series of resolutions 
congratulating Premier Léon Blum on the legislation.  Repeating its earlier stress on tolerance 
and class, the party stressed that the law was necessary in moral and intellectual terms, and 
argued that it would bring numerous new opportunities to the province‟s working classes who 
would receive a fuller education.
102
 Crucially, for the SFIO, the legislation represented a step 
towards the “école unique, the only possible education system in a truly democratic state.”103  
Again, the party adopted the language of social equality to support reform. 
The SFIO response was not, however, as vocal as it had been in 1925.  This was 
partly a result of the party‟s reduced electoral strength.  In the 1936 election, it had lost both 
its remaining parliamentary seats and its total share of the vote had dropped to 11 percent in 
the Bas-Rhin and 21 percent in the Haut-Rhin, from 1919 totals of 36.5 percent and 36.9 
percent respectively.
104
  Yet it also reflected the widening gap between the local and national 
SFIO, which had been brought into focus by Blum‟s legislation.  Firstly, Blum‟s policy 
allowed local municipalities to drop the teaching of German.  This contradicted the local 
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SFIO program, which had continually demanded education in German, the mother tongue of 
most Alsatians, and particularly of the Alsatian working classes.  Secondly, according to the 
Socialist national newspaper Le Populaire, the government viewed the legislation as a means 
to retain Alsatian privileges, in this case the privilege of more extensive education.
 105
  The 
Alsatian SFIO, on the other hand, had consistently argued that the Alsatians needed to be 
subject to exactly the same legislation as the populations of other French regions if they were 
to become true French citizens.  These differences did not have the opportunity to develop 
into a confrontation.  When Blum fell from power the law was reinterpreted so that boys 
could leave at fourteen with religious and German education intact.  Yet whatever the 
government‟s intentions, its policy had clearly set them at odds with the local party.  In this 
sense, Alsatian Socialist discussions over education illustrate the diversity of SFIO policy in 
interwar France, and show that a loose party structure was not a characteristic limited to the 
parties of the conservative right.
106
   
While their stance on language distanced the Alsatian federations from their national 
colleagues, their fervently pro-assimilationist stance distanced them from their electorate.  
The elections of 1936 compounded the party‟s electoral decline, and no Socialist was elected 
in Alsace for the first time since the election of the “sky-blue” Chamber in 1919.  Sections of 
its core constituency continued to support the party‟s stance; prefectural reports on party 
meetings in the lead-up to the 1936 election underline the continued support for the SFIO‟s 
stance on education.
107
  Nevertheless, the issue of autonomism cut through Alsatian politics, 
and, in spite of the Socialists‟ attempts to distance themselves from it, autonomism had a 
significant impact on the party‟s electoral fortunes.  The SFIO‟s presentation of itself as 
uncompromisingly assimilationist made it appear out of touch with the realities of Alsatian 
politics.  Across the region, electoral victories were secured by parties that demanded that 
Alsace‟s cultural distinctiveness receive political recognition108.  The SFIO portrayed itself, 
and allowed itself to be depicted, as a party that demanded that Alsace be treated like all other 
regions of France.  This contributed to its steady loss of votes throughout the 1930s.  It also 
misrepresented the party‟s program, as the party‟s vision of Alsace‟s place within the French 
Republic involved Alsace acting as a model for nationwide reform in terms of social and 
municipal legislation, and the retention of Alsatian culture within the region.  Republicanism 
for the SFIO in Alsace involved use of the German language, and acceptance of Alsatian 
cultural particularities.  But, as the party increasingly focused on religion, it was unable to 
transmit this ideology of republicanism to the Alsatian electorate. 
As a result, throughout the 1930s, the SFIO continued to develop the analysis of 
language, religion and education that it had first articulated in 1918.  Indeed, in 1935 the Bas-
Rhin Federation passed a resolution that proclaimed its fidelity to the party‟s 1919 program 
on Alsatian problems, “particularly with regard to the introduction of the secular laws.”109  
This was in spite of the changes in emphasis that events in the interwar years had provoked.  
Throughout these years, behind all Socialist statements and rhetoric lay two central points.  
Firstly, that the Alsatian population needed to be subject to the same legislation as the 
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populations of all other French regions if they were to be truly French; this was notably the 
case for separation and secular education.  Secondly, integration into the nation would occur 
only through the introduction of bilingualism.  For the Alsatian SFIO, speaking the French 
language was a broad aim that would allow the Alsatians to participate in French national 
cultures.  Neglect of the French language, on the other hand, would lead to the economic and 
intellectual regression of the province.  In this sense, language represented a tool for the 
inculcation of culture and national spirit as well as the means for social advancement for the 
Alsatian working classes.  Nevertheless, while it was a desirable component of identity, it 
certainly was not an essential one, and the Socialists stressed the importance of continued use 
of the German language throughout the interwar years.  The Alsatian SFIO saw French 
patriotism as rooted in attachment to the French nation rather than in linguistic criteria.  
Consequently, it stressed that it was possible to combine attachment to the Republic with use 





The SFIO‟s discussions over primary schooling in Alsace reveal that not everyone in interwar 
France believed that French was the sole language of republicanism.  The party argued in 
favor of bilingualism, and for both French and German education in Alsatian schools.  It 
stressed that lessons in German represented the best means of ensuring social equality for all 
sections of Alsatian society and particularly the working classes, and also of facilitating 
Alsace‟s reintegration into France.  It developed these arguments while reasoning that the 
continuation of religious education in the province represented a barrier to the province‟s 
integration into the Republic.  Rather than associating regional language with religion and 
reaction as earlier republicans had done, the Alsatian SFIO argued that German represented 
the language of republicanism in Alsace.  In disassociating language from religion, party 
militants forged a distinct regional relationship between local language and national political 
cultures.   
Histories of the Third Republic often stress the association between republican 
articulations of nationality and the French language.  The experience of the SFIO in interwar 
Alsace offers a different picture, as party militants argued that it was possible to combine 
attachment to the French Republic with speaking the German language. The party‟s stance 
was the result of historical circumstances; the period of annexation meant that the region 
missed out on the years of early Third Republican nation-building, while developing a strong 
sense of regional identity that was neither French, nor German, but defiantly Alsatian.
110
  
After 1918, this situation was compounded by local cultural particularities, including the 
widespread use of the German language and the unusual political importance of the clergy.  
These particularities impacted upon politics, along with all other areas of daily life.  For the 
SFIO, the Catholic Church represented a longstanding enemy, and, as a result, after 1918 the 
party was keen to adopt the Radicals‟ anti-clerical mantle in the province as a means to 
undermine the clergy‟s influence.  The party did not, however, assume the Radicals‟ attitude 
towards regional languages.  Rather, the SFIO had a longstanding attachment to the German 
language, a testament to its roots in the German Socialist movement and its understanding of 
the German language as an important part of Alsatian culture.  During the years of 
annexation, the Alsatian party had appropriated aspects of French revolutionary culture for a 
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German-speaking audience, as in pamphlets entitled “Freiheit, Gleicheit and Brüderlichkeit” 
and illustrations of a female figure resembling Marianne.
111
  After the return to France, this 
attachment, combined with the party‟s competition with the PCF and concern for its working 
class constituency, served to secure the place of the German language in Alsatian socialist 




 In a broad sense, the discussions over education in interwar Alsace illustrate the 
tensions between “national” politics at the center and more regionally based politics at the 
periphery in interwar France.  The Alsatian SFIO forged its own understanding of French 
republicanism, which accepted the anti-clericalism of the early Third Republic but developed 
an inclusive attitude towards the use of regional language.  The difficulties that party leaders 
had in convincing national governments of the suitability of their proposals reflected the 
continued association made by these governments, whether they belonged to the left or right, 
of regional language and religion.  The Alsatian SFIO‟s separation of the two issues, on the 
other hand, offers a window onto varieties of republicanism in interwar France, as well as 
onto the tensions between central and peripheral political cultures.  Of course, in many 
respects the Alsatian case is unique.  A combination of history, culture and political 
circumstances served to create a set of conditions that were exceptional amongst French 
regions.  Nevertheless, the Alsatians articulated their ideas in republican terms, mobilized 
republican history and thought of themselves as French republicans.  In this sense, they offer 
a stirring reminder of the ways in which national ideas were reinterpreted at a grassroots, 
regional level.  For the Alsatian Socialists, secularity and regional language were not simply 
compatible but essential, as they sought to re-shape the political landscape in both their petite 
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